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THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
AND THE SEC
In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act1 (RFPA)
as Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Control
Act.' The RFPA represents an attempt by Congress to accommodate the
conflicting interests of legitimate government investigation and an in-
dividual's right to conduct business without government intrusion.' The
RFPA establishes certain procedures that federal agencies and depart-
ments must observe in order to obtain records from financial institu-
tions.' The RFPA also provides for certain exceptions to such pro-
cedures.' Significantly, the RFPA provides a two year exemption from
the provisions of Title XI for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)." On November 10, 1980, the RFPA became effective with respect
to the SEC.7 The first important decision concerning the proper con-
struction of the applicability of the RFPA to the SEC is Hunt v. United
States Securities & Exchange Commission.8
Courts describe communications that a customer makes to a finan-
cial institution as confidential While the law does not consider such
communications privileged," courts nevertheless have held banks liable
for revealing a customer's financial records to private parties." In situa-
12 U.S.C. §§ 3400-3422 (Supp. 1I 1979).
Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3461.
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9375; Kirschner, The Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978-The Congressional Response to United States v. Miller: A Procedural
Right to Challenge Government Access to Financial Records, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 10, 13
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Kirschner]; Smith, The Public's Need for Disclosure v. The In-
dividual's Right to Financial Privacy: An Introduction to the Financial Right to Privacy
Act of 1978, 32 AD. L. REV. 511, 513 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
12 U.S.C. § 3402 (Supp. III 1979). See also note 30 infra.
Id. § 3422; text accompanying note 53 infra.
' 12 U.S.C. § 3422 (Supp. II 1979); text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
7 12 U.S.C. § 3422 (Supp. II 1979).
1 See Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex. 1981); text accompanying notes 45-115
infra.
, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 242-43, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172
(1974); see Right to Financial Privacy Act S. 1343, Hearings Before the Sub-Comm. on
Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statements of A. A. Milligan, Harold R. Arthur, and Lucille M.
Creamer). See generally Note, Bank Recordkeeping and the Customer's Expectation of
Confidentiality, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bank Recordkeep-
ing].
" See Bank Recordkeeping, supra note 9, at 90-91. In United States v. Miller, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether there exists an evidentiary
privilege between the customer and his financial institution. 425 U.S. 435, 443 n.4 (1976).
" See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (im-
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tions involving governmental access to financial records, however,
courts have subordinated the privacy interests of an individual to the
government's need for information.12
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA), which makes records of customer transactions available to
government agencies.13 In United States v. Miller,4 the Supreme Court
plied duty on part of bank not to disclose information negligently, wilfully, maliciously, or
intentionally to third parties concerning depositor's account); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 583, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (implied contract exists between bank and
customer not to disclose customer's account information unless law or customer authorizes).
See also 10 AM. JUR. 2d BANKS § 332 (implied term of contract that banker not divulge to
third parties information relating to customer that banker acquires through keeping of
customer's account, unless consent of customer given or authorized by court). Banks have
sought to protect themselves from the threat of liability by establishing internal restric-
tions on employees. Kirschner, supra note 3, at 14; Bank Recordkeeping, supra note 9, at 93.
12 Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 318-319 (9th Cir. 1969) (bank records subject to
production in response to valid legal process); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 267 U.S.
576 (1925), affd 295 F. 142, 143 (S.D. Ala. 1924) (bank forced to disclose records when govern-
ment agency orders disclosure). See generally Bank Recordkeeping, supra note 9, at 94.
"' Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-59, 31 U.S.C. §§
1051-62, 1081-83, 1101-05, 1121-22 (Supp. III 1979). Prior to the BSA, financial institutions
frequently retained copies of customers' records to protect themselves in case of customer
claims. Palmer & Palmer, Complying with The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 96
BANKING L.J. 196, 199 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Palmer & Palmer]. The increasing cost and
delay involved in maintaining customers' records, however, led to the cessation of the prac-
tice of photocopying checks. Id. In the late 1960's Congress became conscious of the increase
in white collar crime, federal tax evasion, and the flow of currency into secret foreign bank
accounts. Kirschner, supra note 3, at 12 & 15. Finding that records banks maintained were
insufficient to aid government agencies in prosecuting infractions of illegal customer ac-
tivities, Congress enacted the BSA. Id. at 15; see California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 25-27 (1973). Title I of the BSA directs banks to prepare and maintain certain
customer records for a five year period. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (Supp. III 1979). Congress stated
that the purpose of Title I is to aid the government in the investigation of the illegal ac-
tivities of customers. Id. § 1829(a)(1). Title II of the BSA imposes on the bank the duty not
only to record, but also to report certain transactions to government authorities involved in
law enforcement. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081, 1101 (Supp. III 1979). The reporting requirements of
Title II pertain to both American and foreign transactions. Id. The BSA provoked a strong
public reaction and incited a demand for the imposition of restraints on government in-
vestigation. See Kirschner, supra note 3, at 16; Bank Recordkeeping, supra note 9, at 90.
Customers of financial institutions initiated suits asserting that the BSA violated
customers' expectations of privacy in financial records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). Adjudicating such claims, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the BSA. United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. at 438; California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 52-54. In California Bankers
Ass'n v. Shultz, several individual bank customers, a bank, the California Bankers Associa-
tion, and the American Civil Liberties Union brought an action against the Secretary of the
Treasury claiming the BSA was unconstitutional. 416 U.S. at 41. The plaintiffs alleged that
the regulations enforcing the BSA violated the fourth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. Plaintiffs also contended that when a bank maintains
records under statutory constraint, the institution acts as a governmental agency and, in ef-
fect, seizes a customer's records. Id. at 66. Rejecting the plaintiff's first argument, the
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addressed the issue of whether the Bank Secrecy Act violated the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.'5 The Government charged
Miller with operating an unregistered still and evading federal tax
laws.'6 Issuing grand jury subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, the
Government requested the production of documents relating to Miller's
accounts." The Government did not notify the defendant of the issuance
of the subpoenas.'8 At trial, Miller filed a motion to suppress the in-
troduction of microfilm copies of his bank records.' 9 The trial court
denied Miller's motion, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision."0
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that Miller
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his
Supreme Court held that the mere maintenance of records is not an illegal search and
seizure since a bank may reveal such records only pursuant to legal process. Id. at 27, 52, 54
n.24, 68-69 n.28. In addition, the Court ruled that the bank has a substantial interest in the
transactions, and, therefore, the institution is not a mere agent but rather a party to such
transactions. Id. The Court reserved the question of whether the depositor has a fourth
amendment right in his records. Id. at 53-54 n.24. See generally Note, The Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act: New Protection for Financial Records, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 597, 603-04
(1980) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Financial Privacy] (Supreme Court decision in
California Bankers Ass'n thwarted lower court decisions holding in favor of customer's
right to financial privacy).
425 U.S. 435 (1975).
"Id. at 441; see note 14 supra.
, 425 U.S. at 436. Sheriff department officials in Kathleen, Ga. discovered a 7,500
gallon capacity distillery, 175 gallons of whiskey, and several other articles following a fire
in a warehouse. Id. at 437.
'7 Id.
,S Id. at 438.
, Id. The Supreme Court stated that the record was unclear whether the Government
had offered the bank records to the grand jury as evidence. Id. The records were, however,
used in the investigation and at trial to establish the overt acts comprising the conspiracy
charge against Miller. Id.
" 500 F.2d 751, 766 (5th Cir. 1974). On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Miller argued that
the BSA violates depositors' fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id. Miller attacked the BSA's requirement that banks microfilm depositors'
checks. Id. Miller stated government agencies could gain access to such records from the
bank, thereby depriving customers of standing to protest. Id. at 756. In addition, Miller con-
tended that the subpoenas the government issued to the banks were defective. Id. The Fifth
Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in California Bankers Assn' v. Shultz
precluded Miller's first contention that the BSA violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 756.
The Fifth Circuit, however, found defendant's argument concerning the defective sub-
poenas persuasive. Id. The appellate court granted the motion of exclusion, holding that
under the Fifth Circuit's reading of Shultz the subpoenas failed to constitute legal process.
Id. at 757-58. See also S. REP. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) (Senate Banking
Committee Report on Bank Secrecy Act stated law enforcement officials allowed access to
bank records kept under BSA only pursuant to subpoena or other lawful process); H.R. REP.
No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970) (House Report contains restrictions analogous to
Senate Report admonishing government that records banks maintain under BSA only ac-
cessible by legal means).
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bank records."' The Court considered the nature of the documents in
order to determine whether Miller had a reasonable expectation of
privacy." Finding the checks to be commercial instruments rather than
confidential communications, the Court held that the checks were not
the equivalent of private papers and, thus, not entitled to the protection
of the fourth amendment.'
21 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1975).
Id. at 442. The Supreme Court always looks to the nature of the document in deter-
mining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (plaintiff has no basis for expectation of privacy once plaintiff
turns records over to accountant realizing that accountant must reveal information to
government for tax return purposes).
1 425 U.S. at 442. The Court held that because Miller had placed his checks in commer-
cial channels, he voluntarily had made public information relating to his financial status. Id.
Looking to the checks as originally drawn rather than the copies, the Court held plaintiff
had no privacy interest in the information that the checks contained. Id. In California
Bankers Ass'n, Justice Douglas argued to the contrary. 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent, the Justice stated that the checks a person draws define the individual
himself. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Other courts have held that a check is not commercial
paper, but a biographical sketch of its drawer. See, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
3d 244, 247, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974). Hence, the argument is that the
right to receive protection under the fourth amendment derives not from a property in-
terest in the check, but from the fact that the customer maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the check's confidential nature. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
Relying on Katz v. United States, the Court in Miller reiterated that the fourth amendment
does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public. 425 U.S. at 442. One writer
suggests that adherence to Katz would require a finding that Miller reasonably expected
the government would not violate his privacy. Comment, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy in Bank Records: A Reappraisal of United States v. Miller and Bank Depositor
Privacy Rights, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 255 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Reasonable Expectations]. In Katz, the Court held that the government violated
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in the transfer of information by a public
medium. Id. Similarly, in Miller, the defendant was utilizing a public intermediary to effect
a transmittal of information. Id. Therefore, the Court should accord Miller's expectation of
privacy in the communication of information through the channels of a bank the same pro-
tection as Katz's communication by means of a public phone. Id. In Miller, however, the
Supreme Court ruled that a depositor assumes the risk that information transmitted to a
financial institution will be conveyed to government officials. 425 U.S. at 442. The Miller
Court stated that Congress assumed customers did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in bank records when the legislature enacted the BSA. 425 U.S. at 443-44.
In Burrows v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court revealed the fallacy of the
argument that a depositor voluntarily assumes the risk of exposure. 13 Cal. 3d 244, 247, 529
P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974). The California court stressed the fact that for
members of society to exist in the modern economy without taking advantage of bank ac-
counts is nearly impossible. Id. Thus, the disclosure of information to one's bank is not a
purely volitional act. Id. The Burrows court cited the 1890 Warren and Brandeis article,
"The Right to Privacy," in which the writers prophesized the need for an expansion of con-
stitutional rights to contend with the development of new business inventions and methods.
Id. at 596 n.4. See also United States v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749-50 (1979) (dissent) (in-
dividual must have choice before court can hold person to have assumed risk voluntarily).
One commentator specifically repudiates the application of the assumption of risk
theory in Miller. 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7, at 415 (1978). LaFave argues that
1076 [Vol. 39:1073
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In effect, the Miller Court found that the government is not subject
to the controls of the fourth amendment in seeking access to financial
records that a third party maintains.24 In 1974, Congress established the
Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) to study and make recom-
mendations concerning the standards the business community uses in
the protection of personal information. 25 The Miller decision motivated
the PPSC to call for the creation of a statutory expectation of privacy in
a customer's financial records.26 On the state level, many legislatures
established procedures for disclosure of customers' financial records.
27
The need for federal legislation that would guarantee a right of financial
privacy, however, still existed. Thus, in response to the Miller decision"
and public sentiment, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy
Act in 1978.29
the decision of an individual to maintaif a bank account is not a relinquishment of the
cutomer's privacy. Id. If the utilization of these economic intermediaries is purely a voli-
tional act, then in effect, the customer must choose between foregoing the necessity of using
a bank account and waiving a privacy interest. Id.
I See The Right to Financial Privacy, supra note 14, at 607. Dissenting in Miller,
Justice Brennan maintained that a customer has a right to privacy in his bank records. Id.
at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Citing Shultz, Justice Brennan argued that the government
illegally obtained the evidence the prosecutor used to convict Miller because the subpoenas
were defective and thus failed to constitute legal process. 425 U.S. at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Not only did Justice Brennan adopt the finding of the court of appeals that the
subpoenas were defective, but the Justice also described the failure of the government to
notify Miller of the issuance of the subpoenas as a fatal constitutional defect. Id. Justice
Brennan adopted the California Supreme Court's position in Burrows that the fourth
amendment protects the customer's expectation that records a customer transmits to his
bank will remain private. Id. at 448.
- 5 U.S.C. § 552(2) (Supp. III 1979).
2 PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY, Recommendation 1, at 362-63 (1977).
1 See ALAS. STAT. 06.05.175a-b, .30.120 (1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7460-7493 (West
Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.111(1) (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 161/2, § 48.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1130 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 289.271 (1970);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§ 224-247 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 117, § 17 (1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.11 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 81-5-55, -11-5 (1972); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 369.099 (West Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1013 (1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 722.118 (1975); PA. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020 (West Supp. 1979-80); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
7-14-1 to -5 (1953); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 215.02, .08 (West Supp. 1979-80). See generally The
Safe Banking Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 9086 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Right to Financial Privacy, supra note 14, at
609.
8 See Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 208, 210 (1980) (RFPA intended to limit Miller
decision); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978) (legislative history illustrates
Congress enacted RFPA to alleviate congressional uneasiness with Miller ruling).
9 See Smith, supra note 3, at 529. On March 12, 1975, Senator Alan Cranston introduced
Senate Bill 1343. Id. Congress held hearings in 1976 on Senate Bill 1343, after which the
House of Representatives introduced H.R. 8133. Id. In 1977, Congress incorporated H.R.
8133 as Title XI of H.R. 9086 of the Safe Banking Act of 1977. Id. Congress revised H.R.
9086 several times, which ultimately resulted in H.R. 13471. Id. Congressman St. Germain
1982] 1077
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The RFPA prohibits federal agencies from obtaining access to
customer records that financial institutions maintain unless the govern-
ment follows one of five specified procedures." The first procedure
introduced H.R. 13471, which Congress finally enacted into law as H.R. 14279. Id. See also
Palmer & Palmer, supra note 14, at 198 n.18.
o 12 U.S.C. §§ 3404-3408 (Supp. III 1979). Predicated on the notions of notice and op-
portunity to be heard, the RFPA in general requires the government to notify the customer
of its request within ten to fourteen days after the government contacts the bank. See
Smith, supra note 3, at 530. In addition, the customer has the right to challenge the validity
of the government request. Id. § 3410. The RFPA establishes specific provisions for
challenging an authorized government demand for financial records. Id. The customer may
file a motion to quash the subpoena or summons in a federal district court, or he may file an
application to enjoin a formal written request. Id. The customer must serve the government
with the motion by hand or mail. Id. Congress designed the service provisions to provide
the government with sufficient notice while keeping the procedure as simple as possible.
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Npws 9273, 9325. The motion must state the customer's
reasons for believing no legitimate law enforcement purpose exists or indicate that the
records are not relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or that the government
has failed to comply substantially with the provisions of the statute. 12 U.S.C. § 3410 (Supp.
III 1979). The individual must attach an affidavit or sworn statement to the motion stating
that he is a customer of the financial institution being subpoenaed. Id. In attacking the pur-
pose of the subpoena, the customer need not prove the absolute absence of a legitimate law
enforcement objective. [1978] U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 9273, 9325. The RFPA does not
require the customer to make a detailed evidentiary showing. Id. He must, however, show a
factual basis for his position. Id. The ultimate burden lies with the government to prove the
legitimacy of the purpose. Id. If the court finds the customer's challenge adequate, the court
must order the government agency to file a sworn response. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(b) (Supp. III
1979). The court will make a decision on the basis of the filings or conduct additional pro-
ceedings. Id. Within seven days the court must render a decision on the challenge. Id. The
RFPA provides that the challenge procedures of the Act are the sole judicial remedies
available to the customer in resisting disclosure of his records. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(e) (Supp. III
1979).
The government may use or withhold information the agency obtains from the
disclosure of records only for the original purpose for which the government sought the in-
formation. [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9326. The Act prohibits the transfer of
the information to another agency unless the agency certifies in writing that the records are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement investigation within the transfering agency's
jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 3412 (Supp. III 1979). The customer must receive notice of the
transfer within fourteen days. Id.
Costs of complying with the RFPA may be high. The Right to Financial Privacy, supra
note 14, at 614-15. Therefore, Congress has placed the economic burden on the government.
Id. The government agency must compensate financial institutions for the reproduction and
processing of information when the RFPA applies to the government authority or customer.
12 U.S.C. § 3415(a) (Supp. III 1979). The United States District Court retains jurisdiction
over claims arising under the RFPA. Id. § 3416. The only remedies available for transgres-
sions of the RFPA are actual and punitive damages, recovery for attorney's fees, and civil
penalties imposing a one hundred dollar fine for each disclosure obtained in violation of the
RFPA. Id. § 3417. In seeking financial information, the government must describe the
records as specifically as possible. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (Supp. 111979). Congress stated that the
requirement that the government reasonably describe the documents precludes the usage
of a blanket request for "all records." [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9322. See
also text accompanying note 32 infra.
1078 [Vol. 39:1073
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available involves gaining the authorization of the customer.' To qualify
for this section, the agency must obtain a statement signed by the
customer, which reasonably identifies the records the government is
seeking, delineates the purpose of the disclosure, and designates who
may use the records.12 The second procedure allows the government to
use an administrative subpoena or summons to gain access to an in-
dividual's financial records.3 Certain factors must be present before the
agency may invoke this method. The government must have reason to
believe that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry, and the agency must serve or mail a copy of the subpoena or sum-
mons to the customer. In addition, the government must give the
customer ten days from the date of service, or fourteen days from the
date of mailing, to file an affidavit or motion to quash. 5 The third method
of obtaining access to customer records is through the use of search war-
rants. 8 The fourth procedure enables the government to use a judicial
subpoena to gain access to customer records." The final method involves
the use of a formal written request directed to a financial institution by a
government official.3 8
The RFPA provides for certain exceptions to the provisions of Title
XI. 9 The most significant exception involved the grant of a two year
3,12 U.S.C. § 3404(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
, Id. The authorization is valid for three months, and the customer may revoke the
authorization until the bank discloses the records. Id.
' Id. § 3405. An administrative subpoena is a judicially enforceable request for
documents. R. ROWE, HANDLING AN SEC INVESTIGATION 1980, 303 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
RowE]. Agencies, however, have no power to enforce an administrative subpoena and must
secure compliance through a court order. Id.
12 U.S.C. § 3405 (Supp. III 1979). The term "reason to believe" in §§ 3405, 3407, and
3408 does not encompass any reason no matter how remote or theoretical. [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9323. Congress intended the phrase "legitimate law enforcement
purpose" to establish a less demanding standard than probable cause. Id. Congress believed
that the combination of the two phrases would be a sufficient safeguard for a customer's
financial records. Id.
12 U.S.C. § 3405 (Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 3406.
3 Id. § 3407. A judicial subpoena is any court order that demands the disclosure of
records. ROWE, supra note 41, at 304. The government uses judicial subpoenas at trial or
during discovery to obtain customer records in the possession of a financial institution. Id.
12 U.S.C. § 3408 (Supp. II 1979). This method can be used only if no administrative
summons or subpoena authority is available to the government official and the head of the
agency or department has issued regulations authorizing the request. Id.
- 12 U.S.C. § 3413 (Supp. III 1979). The exceptions to the RFPA include the dissemina-
tion of information that is not identifiable as records of an individual customer, the examina-
tion of records by supervisory agencies, disclosure under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and
the disclosure of information federal statutes or regulations require to be reported. Id. In
addition, the RFPA exempts the disclosure of records relating to litigation or ad-
ministrative adjudicative proceedings involving the government and the customer, grand
jury subpoenas, and the investigation of the financial institution itself. Id. If the government
is interested solely in the name, address, number, and type of account, or is concerned with
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grace period to the SEC. 0 Two considerations influenced Congress in
deciding to exempt the SEC temporarily from the RFPA." The
legislature acknowledged the stringency of the SEC's internal pro-
cedures and also recognized the threat the Commission posed to the
passage of the RFPA if Congress did not exempt the SEC.42 Congress
specifically granted the exemption to provide the SEC with time to
study how to achieve a fair accommodation between an individual's in-
terest in the privacy of his bank records and the needs of the SEC.43 As
of November 10, 1980, the RFPA became applicable to the SEC.44 In a re-
cent district court decision, the court construed the provisions of the
RFPA with respect to the SEC.4"
In Hunt v. United States Securities & Exchange Commission,46 the
Hunts, both individually and as partners of Hunt International
Petroleum Company (HIPCO) and of the Hunt-Stephens partnership, filed
a motion for preliminary injuction against the SEC. The SEC had
issued a series of subpoenas on plaintiffs and their banks in conjunction
with an inquiry into possible violations of federal securities law.4" During
the Commission's investigation of plaintiffs' trading activities relating to
the "silver crisis" of 1979 and early 1980, the RFPA became effective
with respect to the SEC.49 In instituting the present suit, the Hunts
foreign accounts in the United States and operating under a specific statute, the provisions
of the RFPA do not apply. Id. See also Allison v. SEC, 14 S.L.R. 301 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (sub-
poenas asking only for name, address, account number, and type of account of customer ex-
empted from notice requirements of RFPA). The RFPA also provides for special ar-
rangements when dealing with emergencies, foreign surveillance, the Secret Service, or
grand juries. 12 U.S.C. § 3413 (Supp. III 1979).
12 U.S.C. § 3422 (Supp. III 1979).
4, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9275, 9376.
42 Id.
[19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3874, 3875.
. 12 U.S.C. § 3422 (Supp. III 1979).
41 See Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
46 Id.
41 Id. at 583 & 587. The two partnerships of Hunt International Petroleum Company
(HIPCO) and Hunt-Stephens qualify as customers under the RFPA because they include
fewer than five individuals. Id. HIPCO is a partnership in which W. H. Hunt, N. B. Hunt,
and Lamar Hunt are the only partners. Id. at 587. Hunt-Stephens is a partnership in which
plaintiffs W. H. Hunt and Paul Stephens are the sole partners. Id.
" Id.; see note 52 infra.
'" Brief for Appellant at 4, Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellant]. In March 1980, sources notified the SEC that plaintiffs were
unable to meet margin calls on positions in silver future contracts they maintained with
broker-dealers registered with the SEC. Id. The rapid decline of the price of silver bullion
threatened the Hunts' account. Id. As of March 28, 1980, the Hunts owed broker-dealers a
sum of $439,935,900. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Silver Prices and the Adequacy of Federal Actions in the Marketplace, 1979-1980,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 466-81 (1980). The decline in the silver market and the Hunts' inability
to meet their obligations seriously affected at least three major broker-dealers. Brief for
Appellant, supra, at 5.
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sought to enjoin the Commission from violating their rights as
customers under the RPFA. 0
On February 19, 1981, the Commission issued subpoenas duces
tecum upon First International Bancshares, Inc., the parent holding com-
pany of National Bank of Dallas (First in Dallas).5' In an attempt to
describe the nature of the investigation, the customer notices merely
listed six statutes." The notices did not contain a complete copy of the
subpoenas or attachments." Rather, the SEC had deleted portions of the
attachments leaving large gaps where sentences were missing. 4 The ex-
cisions related to the production of records concerning persons and en-
tities, other than plaintiffs, who may have been entitled to notice under
the RFPA.5 5 The SEC defined the term "Hunts" in the original subpoena
to include not only the individual plaintiffs, but also sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and other ventures that plaintiffs controlled. 6 The
customer notice, however, defined the term "Hunts" to encompass the
Hunts merely as individuals.5 Thus, the plaintiffs did not receive notice
of the demand for documents relating to their partnerships. 8
On February 25, 1981, the Commission served subpoenas on
Republic National Bank of Dallas (Republic) and Citibank N.A.
(Citibank).5 Pursuant to plaintiffs' instructions, the SEC directed the
customer notices to the Hunts' attorneys. 0 The defective notices were
similar to the ones the SEC issued in conjunction with the First in Dallas
subpoena.6' The SEC, however, never received customer records under
the subpoenas.2
520 F. Supp. at 583.
2, Id. The SEC issued the subpoena on February 19, 1981, and incorrectly addressed
the subpoena to First National Bancshares, Inc. Id.
" Id. at 593. The notice sent to plaintiffs stated that the SEC was seeking access to the
subpoenaed documents in order to adduce whether plaintiffs had violated the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, the First Act Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, or the In-
vestment Advisors Act of 1940. Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 594. The customer notice was a photocopy of the complete attachment with
gaps where the agency had covered portions of the original attachment with paper. Id.
I Id. at 593. The SEC did not notify any persons or entities other than plaintiffs in
relation to the February 19, 1981, subpoena. Id. Individuals other than plaintiffs served as
officers and directors of the corporations and entities mentioned in the subpoena. Id. These
officers and directors may have been entitled to receive notive if they had qualified under




Id. at 594. The subpoenas the SEC served on Republic and Citibank were identical
to the February 19, 1981, subpoenas the Commission served on First in Dallas. Id.; see text
accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
520 F.Supp. at 594.
8, Id.; see text accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
520 F.Supp. at 600.
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Investigating the failure of public corporations to report the risks in-
volved in extending loans to the Hunts, the SEC issued subpoenas to
four banks on April 16, 1980.3 The April subpoenas, however, did not im-
pose a continuing duty on the banks to produce future records relating
to the Hunts. 4 Subsequent to April 1980, the Hunts obtained a 1.1 billion
dollar loan to refinance silver obligations through Placid Oil Company
(the Placid Loan). 5 These four banks had participated with First in
Dallas, Republic, and Citibank in the Placid Loan."8 The SEC became con-
cerned that the banks may not have disclosed all available information
under the April subpoena that related to the Commission's investiga-
tion. 7 Therefore, the SEC issued update letters to the four banks in an
attempt to obtain information concerning the banks' involvement in the
Placid Loan.8 Concluding that the Placid Oil Company was not a
customer within the meaning of the RFPA, the Commission did not send
customer notices concerning the update letters. 9 Learning of the is-
suance of the letters on March 10, the SEC Director of the Division of
Enforcement ordered the immediate withdrawal of the letters. The
SEC never received any documents in response to the update letters.7
Pursuant to section 3410 of the RFPA, plaintiffs filed a motion to
quash the subpoena issued to First in Dallas.2 The SEC eventually
retracted the subpoena voluntarily and, consequently, never obtained
any financial records under the subpoena. 3 Plaintiffs withdrew their mo-
tion to quash and instituted the present action for injunctive relief on
" Id. at 594. The SEC issued the April 1980 subpoenas to First Bank of Chicago, Royal
Bank, Chemical Bank, and Bankers Trust. Id. at 595. The subpoenas sought documents





" Id. All four letter were identical. Id. The letter in part read:
On April 1, 1980 the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the banks requesting all documentation relating to the Hunts,
silver loans and loans to various broker-dealers. We understand that since that
time the bank participated in a $1.1 billion loan to Placid Oil Company (the "Placid
loan"). To the extent not already provided, please update the production by pro-
viding additional documentation, as described in the subpoena, relating to the
bank's participation in the Placid loan. ...
Id.
69 Id. at 596-97; 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. III 1979) (RFPA customer is individual or part-
nership of five or fewer).
?' 520 F. Supp. at 597.
7: Id.
72 Id. at 583; see text accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
"' 520 F. Supp. at 599.
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March 24, 1981.714 The SEC filed a motion to dismiss the Hunts' suit. 5 The
court granted the SEC's motion to dismiss with respect to two of the
three counts plaintiffs had set forth in their complaint. 8 The court,
however, retained jurisdiction over plaintiffs' third claim, which alleged
that the Commission had violated plaintiffs' rights under the RFPA 71
The Hunt court listed the four traditional prerequisites that the law
requires plaintiffs to establish before a court will grant an application
for preliminary injunction. 8 The factors include proving a substantial
likelihood that plaintiffs ultimately will prevail on the merits and show-
ing that plaintiffs will incur irreparable harm unless the court issues the
injuction. In addition, plaintiffs must prove that the potential harm to
them outweighs the damage that an injunction will inflict on the oppos-
ing party and that the injunction will not be adverse to the public in-
terest. 9 In determining whether plaintiffs carried their burden, the
court looked to the construction of the RFPA and the facts of the case.
The first prerequisite requires that plaintiffs demonstrate sufficiently
that they will prevail at trial on the merits." Discussing the merits of
plaintiffs' contention that the SEC had violated the RFPA, the court
recognized that Congress had enacted the RFPA to counteract the
Miller decision.' Pointing to the principles of notice and opportunity to
challenge as the underpinnings of the RFPA,82 the court stated that the
issue in Hunt involved the SEC's use of customer authorizations, ad-
ministrative subpoenas, and update letters to obtain information under
the RFPA.3 The district court, thus, focused on whether the Commission
1, Id. at 583-84. Plaintiffs' complaint contained three grounds for relief. Id. at 583.
First, the Hunts asserted that the SEC had exceeded the scope and purpose of the Commis-
sion's investigatory order. Id. Second, plaintiffs alleged the SEC was encroaching on the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Id. The plain-
tiffs directed their third claim at the SEC's failure to comply with the RFPA in seeking to
obtain financial information from plaintiffs' banks. Id.
11 Id. at 584.
71 Id. The court dismissed plaintiffs' claims that the SEC was exceeding the scope of its
investigatory order and encroaching on the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. Id. The
court held the claims were not ripe for adjudication. Id.
7 Id.
11 Id. at 585.
1, 520 F. Supp. at 585. See also Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
1981); Florida Medical Ass'n v. HEW, 601 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1979); Compact Van Equip-
ment Co., Inc. v. Legget & Platt, Inc., 566 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardin v. Houston
Chronicle Pub. Co., 572 F.2d 1106, 1107 (5th Cir. 1978); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974).
520 F. Supp. at 585.
" Id. at 601; see text accompanying notes 13-29. See also [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9273, 9306 (Title XI a Congressional reaction to United States v. Miller).
520 F. Supp. at 601. See also note 38 supra.
" 520 F. Supp. at 602.
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had violated plaintiffs' right to receive notice and to challenge the is-
suance of the subpoenas. 4
In dealing with the administrative subpoenas issued to First in
Dallas, Republic, and Citibank, the Hunt court referred to section 3405 of
the RFPA. 5 Section 3405 establishes the requirements that the govern-
ment must meet in order to obtain access to customer records under an
administrative subpoena. In issuing subpoenas to First in Dallas,
Republic, and Citibank, the court found the Commission had sent
customer notices that contained materially different subpoenas and at-
tachments. 7 The SEC had deleted substantial sections of the at-
tachments relating to parties and documents.8 The court concluded that
the RFPA requires that customers receive a complete copy of the sub-
poena and that the SEC had violated the RFPA in this regard.8
The Commission also had failed to determine all the customers who
were entitled to notice under the RFPA.8 8 The court found that the SEC
should have sent customer notices to the partnerships of HIPCO and
Hunt-Stephens. 1 The Hunt court also found that the Commission failed
to meet the requirement that the SEC describe with reasonable specificity
the nature of the government inquiry.2
In considering the Government's defense that under section 3410 of
the RFPA substantial compliance is adequate, the court recognized that
minor and technical offenses would not render the subpoenas defective. 3
The court found that although plaintiffs were aware of the nature of the
inquiry, the excised customer notices were not technical errors, but bla-
tant and intentional deviations from the provisions of the RFPA.8 The
84 Id.
s Id. at 602; text accompanying notes 51-62 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
'7 520 F. Supp. at 603; text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
520 F. Supp. at 594.
" Id. at 603. Section 3405 requires that the agency serve a copy of the subpoena on the
customer. 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (Supp. III 1979). The district court interpreted the language of §
3405 to require the customers to receive a complete copy of the subpoena, regardless of
whether the original subpoena requests documents relating to entities or persons not entitled
to notice under the RFPA. 520 F. Supp. at 603.
" 520 F. Supp. at 604.
9" Id. The court stated that the subpoenas clearly requested production of documents
related to HIPCO and Hunt-Stephens. Id.
92 Id. at 603. See also note 30; text accompanying notes 31-35 supra. The SEC merely
had listed six statutes in a cursory fashion. 520 F. Supp. at 603; text accompanying note 52
supra. The district court held that the listing of the six statutes clearly was inadequate. 520
F. Supp. at 603. At trial, the SEC conceded that the mere recitation of the statutes did not
constitute sufficient description. Id. at 593. The court stated that the SEC could have
satisfied the requirement of reasonable specificity by referring in the notices to the Amended
Order of Investigation, in addition to the specific statutes. Id.
:3 Id. at 603. See also [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9326.
9' 520 F. Supp. at 604. The court emphasized the RFPA requirement of § 3405 that
plaintiffs receive a complete copy of the subpoena. Id.
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district court also rejected the SEC's contention that the failure to
receive any information under the defective subpoenas precluded plain-
tiffs from obtaining relief pursuant to section 3418 of the RFPA.9 '
The district court then dealt with whether the use of update letters
violated the RFPA unless customers received notice of the issuance of
the letters. 6 Noting that the RFPA does not provide for the use of up-
date letters, the court adhered to the general rule Congress established
in section 3402 that a government agency may not gain access to the
financial records of a customer unless the government observes the pro-
visions of the RFPA.9 7 The court found that the SEC's failure to send
notices to customers was an egregious example of the SEC's attempt to
circumvent the RFPA 8 Thus, the Hunt court held that since the SEC
clearly had violated the RFPA by issuing excised customer notices and
update letters, plaintiffs had carried their burden of demonstrating a
substantial likelihood they would prevail at trial on the merits.9
The district court then discussed whether the Hunts had proven
that they would suffer irreparable harm if the court did not grant an in-
junction. ' The court perceived the issue as involving two subissues.''
First, the district court considered the probability that future violations
would occur.'0 2 The SEC contended that since the issuance of the defec-
tive subpoenas and update letters, the Commission had taken remedial
"' Id. at 606. Focusing on the language of § 3418, the court maintained that to require
illegal disclosure of a customer's financial records before a court could grant injunctive
relief would frustrate the purpose of the RFPA. Id. The court pointed to the threat that the
excised subpoenas and update letters posed to a customer's right to challenge such requests
under the RFPA. Id. The court held that plaintiffs' rights under § 3410 to challenge would
be worthless if plaintiffs never received notice of the request. Id.
" Id. at 604.
9Id.
98 Id.
"Id. at 608. Plaintiffs raised two other violations under the RFPA. Id. at 597. The
Hunts alleged that the SEC violated the RFPA in making oral requests for information. Id.
The court dismissed the contention, finding that the agency merely was following up
outstanding subpoenas. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that plaintiffs failed to introduce
evidence that the SEC ever received any information beyond the scope of the outstanding
subpoenas. Id. Therefore, the RFPA did not require the SEC to give notice to customers. Id.
The second argument plaintiffs raised dealt with whether the SEC had conveyed to other
agencies information relating to the Hunts' investigation without adhering to the pro-
cedures the RFPA establishes in § 3412. Id. at 606. Section 3412 requires that one agency
may not transfer information to another agency unless the SEC certifies that the records
are relevant to a legitimate inquiry within the jurisdiction of the agency receiving the infor-
mation. Id. The transferring agency must notify the customer of such a transfer. Id. While
plaintiffs presented evidence that the SEC exchanged information under the CFTC, the
court held that the SEC did not violate the RFPA since the Commission did not transmit
any specific financial information to the CFTC after the effective date of the RFPA. Id.
,® Id. at 608.
101 Id.
" Id. at 608-09.
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measures to insure such violations would not occur in the future. 3
Acknowledging the SEC's good faith attempts to prevent future abuse,
the Commission's reluctance to admit its failure to comply with the
RFPA during trial nevertheless swayed the court."' The court held,
therefore, that a reasonable probability existed that the SEC would
violate the RFPA in the future.' The second subissue concerned
whether future transgressions of the Act would occur if the court refused
to issue an injunction and the extent to which such transgressions would
harm the plaintiffs."' Alarmed at the possibility that the SEC could have
obtained plaintiffs' records under the update letters without notifying
customers, the court held that the plaintiffs would have lost their rights
under the RFPA, and, therefore, the SEC would have harmed the plain-
tiffs irreparably."' The SEC's issuance of the letters would have enabled
the SEC to obtain plantiffs' records without plaintiffs receiving notice
or having the opportunity to challenge the release of such documents."'
In relation to the third factor, the Hunt court balanced the harm a
grant of injunction would inflict upon the SEC against the injury plain-
tiffs would incur if the court denied the injunction."9 The district court
held that no harm could result to the SEC from the court's issuance of an
103 Id. at 608. The SEC has revised the RFPA manual four times since the issuance of
the manual in November 1980. Id. The SEC changed the customer notice forms on February
2, 1981, by including in the notice information relating to alternative choices of venue
available in a challenge to an administrative subpoena. Id. The second revision was on
March 2, 1981. Id. The Commission decided to include in a notice to a subpoenaed financial
institution that the institution must submit an itemized bill to receive recompense for costs
the institution incurs in complying with the RFPA. Id. On April 4, 1981, the Commission
amended the manual to require that customer notice forms specify the statutes and regula-
tions involved in the investigative inquiry. Id. The fourth revision of April 21, 1981, dealt
with the conflict that may arise when a subpoena to a bank requests the account records of
more than one customer. Id. The SEC instructed the staff not to excise any portion of the
subpoena or attachment in such situations. Id. at 601. The Commission also encouraged
members of the agency to seek the advice of the Division of Enforcement's Chief Counsel
when questions arise and prohibited the use of update letters. Id.
104 Id. at 609.
o Id. The district court cited United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326, 333 (1951), for the principle that courts must be cautious of mere promises or "protesta-
tions of repentance and reform" on the part of those attempting to defeat the grant of in-
junctive relief. Id. In Oregon State Medical Society, the Supreme Court dealt with an action
under the Sherman Act for an injunction. 343 U.S. 326, 328 (1951). Plaintiffs sought to
restrain certain medical societies from monopolizing the field of prepaid medical services.
Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that a court does not grant an injunction for punishment
of past conduct, but rather to remedy future or contemporaneous behavior. Id. at 333.
Focusing on defendants' overt and clear reversal of previous policies, the Court refused to
label defendants' behavior as consisting of merely pretensions and promises. Id. at 334. Ac-
cordingly, the Court denied injunctive relief. Id.
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injunction.'0 An injunction would not require the Commission to do
anything more than the RFPA already exacted.' The court found,
however, that if it denied the injunction, plaintiffs possibly would lose
their rights under the RFPA. Stating that no question therefore ex-
isted concerning who would suffer more harm, the court held that plain-
tiffs had proved sufficiently the existence of the third factor. '
The last factor necessary to the grant of an injunction deals with the
effect an injunction would have on the public interest." The Hunt court
held congressional enactment of the RFPA illustrated a declared public
policy that the actions of the government are illegal when not in accord
with the RFPA and, thus, are inimical to the public."5 In conclusion, the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, holding
that plaintiffs had carried their burden of proving the existence of all
four prerequisties.116
The Hunt court erroneously found that plaintiffs carried their
burden in proving the four factors necessary to-the issuance of an injunc-
tion. An initial inquiry with respect to the first prerequisite is whether
the district court had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction.
1 1 7
The Hunt court based its authority on section 3418 of the RFPA. 8 Sec-
tion 3418 provides for the granting of injunctive relief in addition to
other remedies the RFPA establishes. 9 The issue arises whether sec-
tion 3418 is an independent source of relief, or whether it is only ac-
tivated when the agency first violates either section 3410 or 3417. Sec-
tion 3410 provides a customer with the right to challenge a subpoena. '20
Section 3417 involves the right of a customer to institute an action for
damages once an agency has obtained or disclosed a customer's bank
records in violation of the RFPA. 2 '
In Hunt, the SEC had withdrawn the subpoenas and update letters
before the banks had disclosed or transfered any information to the
agency. 2 Therefore, neither section 3410 nor 3417 was applicable. If sec-
tion 3418 is available only after a customer invokes section 3410 or 3417






Ill Id. at 609-10.
116 Id. at 610.
"' See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196 (1962). See
also Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404
U.S. 403 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
... 520 F. Supp. at 606; text accompany note 94 supra.
11 12 U.S.C. § 3418 (Supp. 1I 1979).
'" Id. § 3410; note 30 supra.
'2 12 U.S.C. § 3417 (Supp. III 1979).
" 520 F. Supp. at 607-08.
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jurisdiction to issue an injunction. Moreover, the RFPA grants district
courts jurisdiction under section 3416 only when an agency violates the
RFPA.'" If the SEC withdrew its requests, no violation under section
3410 or 3417 ever arose. Legislative history illustrates that Congress in-
tended that upon a proper showing of abuse a customer could enjoin an
agency from obtaining records without giving a customer notice.12 ' The
SEC did not abuse the procedure of the RFPA, but rather committed an
error in judgment.'25 The agency immediately sought to rectify the
mistake and revised its RFPA manual in an attempt to prevent future
infractions of the RFPA.2 6 The RFPA, in fact, provides governmental
agencies with the opportunity to correct errors they make.' The re-
quirement that the agency certify its compliance with the RFPA before
a financial institution may disclose the requested records illustrates the
flexibility that the RFPA accords federal agencies.'28 Furthermore, since
the Supreme Court denied standing to customers challenging the
disclosure of bank records in United States v. Miller,'29 the Hunt court
could not rely on equity to provide relief for plaintiffs. 3
Additionally, the court did not have jurisdiction because plaintiffs'
claim for injunctive relief was moot. Article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution provides that federal courts have jurisdiction only
over cases and controversies.'3 ' Since the SEC withdrew all defective re-
quests and made assurances to plaintiffs that the SEC would not issue
similar requests in the future, the controversy no longer existed. The
12 U.S.C. § 3416 (Supp. III 1979).
124 [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9321, 9360.
25 520 F. Supp. at 593 & 596. Throughout the drafting of the subpoenas and update let-
ters, SEC staff members exercised their own judgment in arriving at decisions to delete or
serve notice. Id. The SEC had no policy with respect to the issuance of excised subpoenas or
update letters at that time. Id. at 600-01; text accompanying note 102 supra.
,2 See note 102 supra.
12 12 U.S.C. § 3404(b) (Supp. III 1979); text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
,28 12 U.S.C. § 3404(b) (Supp. III 1979).
'2 See text accompanying notes 13-26 supra.
' 520 F. Supp. at 607; Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 35. See also Clayton
Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Clement, 87 F.R.D. 569, 571 (D. Md. 1980) (bank customer has no stand-
ing to challenge disclosure of records in civil suit since suit outside of RFPA coverage);
United States v. Grubb, 469 F. Supp. 991, 995 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (§ 3417 of RFPA provides
that remedies and sanctions established under RFPA only judicially authorized remedies
available).
'' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Cases that are moot do not meet the case or controversy requirement.
See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); SEC v. Medical Commission for Human
Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 51 (1968). To be a con-
troversy under federal constitutional provisions, there must be a concise case admitting of
an immediate and definitive determination of legal rights. Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 223 F. Supp. 296, 303 (M.D. Ga.) affd, 324 F.2d 503.




test for mootness in a case for injunctive relief is whether the injury is
continuing or likely to be repeated. 32 At least one court has stated that
once a party withdraws an illegal request, the application of injunctive
relief is not proper if the incident was unique and the opposing party is
not likely to repeat such actions."n The SEC's good faith efforts to insure
that future violations of the RFPA would not occur and the
Commission's withdrawal and isolated use of the defective requests il-
lustrates the inappropriateness of injunctive relief in the instant case. 34
While the Hunt court found the SEC's begrudging attitude in admit-
ting that it had violated the RFPA evidence of a possibility of future in-
fractions of the RFPA, such support was weak. '35 The Supreme Court
has stated that the moving party in a claim for injunctive relief must
demonstrate that the danger of a recurrent violation is more than a
mere possibility.'36 The Supreme Court listed several factors to consider
in determining whether an opposing party's conduct renders an action
for injunctive relief moot." ' The considerations include the bona fides of
the party's intent to comply in the future, the party's cessation of the ob-
jectionable conduct, and in some instances, the nature of the previous
violations.'" Analyzing the facts of Hunt in light of the Supreme Court's
guidelines, the actions of the SEC render plaintiffs' claim moot. As the
Hunt court noted, the SEC acted in good faith to insure future com-
pliance with the RFPA by revising agency procedures as listed in the
RFPA manual.' 9 The SEC also prohibited the future use of excised sub-
"' Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers of Am., 454 F.2d 1333, 1334
(5th Cir. 1971). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 109 (1978); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
n Famflias v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 520 F. Supp. at 608-09. The Hunt court admitted that the SEC attempted in good
faith to prevent future violations of the RFPA by revising the RFPA manual. Id.; note 102
supra.
"n 520 F. Supp. at 609. The district court described the SEC's attempts to prohibit
future violations of the RFPA as merely "protestations of repentance and reform." 520 F.
Supp. at 609; see text accompanying note 104 supra. In Oregon State Medical Society, the
Supreme Court looked to the behavior of the defendants in determining whether defend-
ants' conduct consisted merely of pretensions and promises. 343 U.S. 326, 328 (1951). The
Supreme Court noted that injunctions are not designed to punish past conduct but rather to
affect future conduct. Id. The Court emphasized the fact that defendants' attitude evidenced
a visible reversal of policy and appeared to be of a permanent nature. Id. at 334. In Hunt,
the SEC made a clear and overt gesture of a permanent character by prohibiting the future
use of excised subpoenas and update letters. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
Therefore, the district court incorrectly relied on Oregon State Medical Society for the rul-
ing that the SEC's remedial measures evidenced merely "protestations of repentance and
reform." 520 F. Supp. at 609.
in United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953).
"7Id. at 633.
Id.
' See text accompanying notes 102 & 103 supra.
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poenas and update letters. 4 ' Finally, the character of the past violations
reveals a judgment error on the part of the SEC rather than an agency-
endorsed stratagem to obtain information illegally.
Assuming the district court did have jurisdiction under section 3418,
the plaintiffs had the burden of proving they were likely to prevail on
the merits."4 Holding that plaintiffs had succeeded in carrying their
burden,' the court mistakenly rejected the SEC's defense that the agency
had complied substantially with the RFPA.43 In the present case, the
SEC presented strong support for its contention that the agency had
complied substantially with Section 3410.14 The SEC's use of the defec-
tive subpoenas and update letters was an isolated incident."4 The fact
that the SEC immediately designed remedial measures to prevent
repetitions of such violations of the RFPA illustrates that the defective
requests represented an unfortunate mistake as opposed to an agency
policy. Furthermore, upon learning of the requests, the Commission's
supervisor demanded that the agency immediately withdraw the sub-
poenas and letters, insuring that the banks would not disclose any
records under the requests.'
4
1
The certification provision of the RFPA supports the SEC's argu-
ment that the court should allow the SEC the opportunity to correct
mistakes before the judicial system becomes involved. Section 3403(b) re-
quires that the Commission certify its compliance with the RFPA before
a financial institution may disclose any records.'47 The SEC specifically
attached cover letters to the subpoenas that the agency sent to the
banks informing the banks of their duty to require certification before
they released any documents. 4 1 Section 3404(b), therefore, illustrates
Congress' intent to allow the Commission the flexibility to monitor its
own activities and rectify its own mistakes. 49
... See text accompanying note 102 supra.
'" 520 F. Supp. at 609.
142 Id.
143 Id.
. In upholding SEC subpoenas, courts generally are lenient. H. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES
AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 11 (1981). Referring to the use of administrative subpoenas
in the inspection of financial records, the Supreme Court in See v. City of Seattle pointed to
the minimal restrictions the Court has placed on the use of administrative subpoenas. 387
U.S. 541, 544-45 (1966). See also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (courts do not interfere with SEC's broad power to investigate and issue sub-
poenas unless SEC abuses power), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071; United States v. Powell, 379
U.S. 48, 58 (1964) (court's role in subpoena enforcement narrow).
14 Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 39. The government issued the subpoenas and
letters during a one week period. Id.
146 520 F. Supp. at 597 & 599.
. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (Supp. III 1979).
,44 Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 21.
,, Id. See also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980) (invocation of judiciary
system denies agency opportunity to rectify own mistakes); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 765 (1975) (same).
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Examining the facts more precisely, the technical rather than the
substantive nature of the defects becomes evident. Congress stated that
substantial compliance with the Act is sufficient. 0 The legislative intent
was to prevent courts from denying access to the Commission due to
minor and technical deviations.'55 The subpoenas allegedly were defec-
tive because of omissions in the customer notices relating to the at-
tachments.5 ' The SEC sent attachments to the customers containing
large and obvious gaps where the SEC had made deletions.' 3 In view of
this fact, the district court was mistaken in finding that a reasonable
person would not be put on notice of the alterations.' Since plaintiffs
had directed the SEC to send any customer notices the SEC issued to
the plaintiffs' attorneys, the court's finding becomes even more suspect
in view of the experience of lawyers with subpoenas.' 5
Similarly, the update letters substantially complied with the RFPA.
Initially, the SEC argued that the agency was seeking records solely
from a corporation that the RFPA does not cover, and hence, the
customers were not entitled to notice.' The district court, however, em-
phasized the poor drafting of the letters and the possibility that the
bankers could interpret the letters as requesting records of the
customers' individual accounts.'" The Government then argued that
since the Commission immediately withdrew the update letters, the
SEC's error was not the type of abuse Congress was concerned with in
providing customers with the remedy of injunctive relief.'58
The enactment of section 78(u)(h), amending the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, further supports the contention that the deletions were
minor.'5 9 Section 78(u)(h)(4)(c) illustrates congressional approval of the
'",12 U.S.C. § 3410 (Supp. 1I 1979).
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9326.
152 520 F. Supp. at 590-92.
"5 Id. at 594.
'5' Id.
" Id. In Corwin Consultants Inc. v. Interpublic Group of Cos., Inc., the IRS contended
it had complied substantially with the notice requirement of a statute under which the agency
was operating. 375 F. Supp. 186, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 512 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1975). The
court emphasized the Mullane v. Hanover Banking and Trust Co. standard requiring that
notice be reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise the parties of the
pendency of an action. Id. The court found the IRS had afforded plaintiffs reasonable notice
and, therefore, allowed the IRS to prevail on its substantial compliance defense. Id. Con-
sidering all the circumstances in Hunt, the court should have found that the SEC had pro-
vided reasonable notice of the subpoenas to the plaintiffs. The gaps in the customer notices
were large and readily apparent. In addition, the SEC forwarded such notices to plaintiffs'
attorneys, men experienced in dealing with subpoenas and notices.
'5 Id. at 596-97; text accompanying note 30 supra.
,5 520 F. Supp. at 587.
'5 Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 41; [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9321,
9360.
,, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(h)(4)(c) (1981). Congress enacted amendment 78(u) in an attempt
to balance the special need of the Commission with the privacy interests of bank customers.
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procedure whereby an agency only serves a customer notice of the por-
tion of the subpoena that specifically pertains to the disclosure of his
records."' In enacting the amendment, Congress recognized that blanket
application of the RFPA seriously could impair the SEC's investigative
effectiveness.18 ' Congress was concerned with the possibility that
customers would use the claim of privacy the RFPA grants as a strategy
to delay and obstruct the Commission's efforts. ' Congress also was im-
pressed with the excellent reputation the SEC had earned in its use of
administrative subpoenas.8 a Hence, Congress was reluctant to subject
the SEC to the full coverage of the RFPA.8 4 Section 78(u)(h)(4)(c) requires
that the agency notify a customer only to the extent that such subpoena
is relevant to the customer's privacy interest.1 ' The enactment of this
amendment, therefore, reinforces the argument that the SEC's use of ex-
cised subpoenas was a minor rather than a serious transgression of the
RFPA.
The court's holding that plaintiffs adequately proved that they
would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction is also
questionable.' Not only did the Commission withdraw the subpoenas
and update letters, but it also agreed to notify the plaintiffs if the agency
was to make a demand for records in the future.8 ' The provision prevent-
ing financial institutions from furnishing customers' records until the
SEC certifies compliance with the RFPA supports the contention that no
threat of irreparable harm existed."8' Furthermore, the Hunts were ex-
perienced businessmen and had taken precautions to be notified if the
[1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3874, 3875. Section 78(h) provides that the Commission
is subject to the RFPA except in specific cases in which the Commission needs prompt ac-
cess to financial records in order to carry out its responsibilities under the federal securities
laws. Id. The Committee on Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce found the SEC is
unique among federal agencies in its need for prompt access to financial records. H. REP.
No. 96-1321 Part I, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980). Under § 78(h) the Commission may have ac-
cess to copies of a customer's financial records without giving prior notice to the customer
to whom the financial records relate. [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3874, 3875. Sec-
tion 78(h)(2) specifies the manner and the circumstances under which the Commission may
delay notice to the customer once the agency has received the records. Id. at 3879. The Com-
mission must make an ex parte showing to a district court that the Commission has met cer-
tain factors before the court will enter an order delaying the notice to the customer. Id. at
3880. Customers may challenge the delay, rendering the SEC subject to civil penalties
similar to those provided that § 3417 of the RFPA provides. Id. at 3882-83.
,1 [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3874, 3875.
,., Id. at 3875.
162 Id.
" Id. at 3877. Congress stated that it was confident that the SEC would continue to ex-
ercise its subpoena authority in a careful and responsible manner. Id.
' Id.
lB 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(h)(4)(c) (1981).
65 520'F. Supp. at 608.
'67 Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 42.
lB 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (Supp. III 1979).
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SEC subpoenaed plantiff's bank records regardless of the RFPA's
guarantees."9
The Hunt court was mistaken in finding that plaintiffs had met the
third prerequisite, which involves balancing the impact an injunction
would have on the SEC against the harm that would occur if plaintiffs
were not successful in obtaining an injunction.' 0 Stating that an injunc-
tion would not injure the SEC because the law already imposed the
burden of adhering to the provisions of the RFPA,I' the district court
failed to consider the practical effect of such an injunction. Not only is
the impact on plaintiffs questionable, but moreover, the granting of an
injunction establishes a serious and dangerous precedent. Enjoining the
SEC in the present case already has and will continue to encourage the
institution of suits in an effort to hinder and delay SEC enforcement in-
quiries. 7' The good faith attempts by the Commission to revise the
RFPA manual and comply with its provisions diminish the possibility
that the SEC's future conduct would harm the plaintiffs irreparably if
the court denied injunctive relief. If the court issued an injunction,
however, the injunction seriously would impede the agency's' investiga-
tion and establish a potentially harmful precedent. The SEC contends
that an injunction, in effect, would permit plaintiffs to avoid the specific
provisions by transforming a customer challenge under section 3410 into
a contempt hearing for any minor deviation from the RFPA.113
The Hunt court's analysis of the fourth element necessary for a
grant of injunctive relief is unsound. The fourth prerequisite involves
determining the effect an injunction would have upon the public in-
terest.174 The court's assertion that the RFPA embodies the ultimate ex-
pression of the public interest is inaccurate.' 5 The existence of federal
securities law demonstrates that society has a profound interest in the
protection of the investing public. The enactment of the RFPA does not
resolve conclusively the conflict between the government's need for in-
formation and a customer's privacy interest in favor of the individual.
The RFPA's limited and specific remedies and procedures evidence the
restrictive nature of an individual's right in the privacy of his financial
5I 20 F. Supp. at 594.
Id. at 609.
171 Id.
17 See, e.g., Daugharty v. SEC, No. 81-C-4557 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 10, 1981); Locascio v. SEC,
(CCH) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98, 257 (D. Nev., Aug. 3, 1981); Redmer v. SEC, No. CV-LC-81-357
(D. Nev. July 14, 1981); Ratliff v. SEC, No. 81-2042 (N.D. Tenn., July 13, 1981); Penelope
Surgent v. SEC, No. 81-1494 (D.N.J., May 27, 1981); John Surgent v. SEC, No. 81-1494
(D.N.J., May 27, 1981); Penelope Surgent v. SEC, No. 81-916 (D.N.J., May 20, 1981); John
Surgent v. SEC, No. 81-915 (D.N.J., May 20, 1981). See also Vilkin, 'Hunt' Court Inhibit
SEC's Enforcement Activities, Legal Times Wash., July 20, 1981, at 2, col. 1.
"' Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 44.
7 520 F. Supp. at 609.
17' Id.
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records."6 The court should not subordinate the government's concern
over the condition of the nation's economic market to an individual's
right to privacy when, as in the present case, the public interest is of an
overriding dimension.
In light of the paucity of support for the court's technical application
of the RFPA, the question arises whether such a decision is an aberra-
tion. Unable to conclude that the SEC's conduct was patently egregious,
the facts unambiguous, or the plaintiffs clearly victims, the district
court's analysis fails to provide sound guidance for other courts in the
application of the RFPA to the SEC.
PATRICIA A. CALORE
76 See note 52 supra.
